Restart nginx on every deploy to avoid stale upstream IPs

nginx resolves the api/web service names to a container IP once, at
its own worker-process startup. docker compose up -d only recreates
containers whose image/config changed, so nginx keeps proxying to the
old, now-dead IP after a deploy rebuilds those containers - every
request 502s, which shows up in the browser as a misleading CORS
error since the bare 502 carries no Access-Control-Allow-Origin
header. Confirmed live: this caused a real multi-hour production
outage after the last two deploys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

.env.example

@@ -22,6 +22,14 @@ NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL=http://localhost:8000
 # this if you run your own self-hosted git server and want the button to
 # point at your fork instead of upstream.
 NEXT_PUBLIC_GIT_REPO_URL=
+# "Open database viewer" link on the Settings page (local developers and
+# server admins only). Access is gated by a short-lived token minted from a
+# real admin login (see apps/api/app/api/v1/db_viewer.py), not a separate
+# password. Blank by default - deliberately NOT defaulted the way
+# NEXT_PUBLIC_GIT_REPO_URL is, since this points at your own deployment's
+# private Adminer instance. Set to https://db.ciagent.org (or your own
+# subdomain) once the db.ciagent.org Nginx block and DNS record exist.
+NEXT_PUBLIC_DB_VIEWER_URL=
 
 # --- Reverse proxy (only relevant once deployed behind Cloudflare/Nginx) -----
 # Empty = trust the direct connection for client-IP resolution (correct for

DEPLOYMENT.md

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ One Docker host runs everything via `docker-compose.prod.yml`: Postgres, Redis,
 | `ciagent.org` | `web:3000` | Next.js frontend |
 | `api.ciagent.org` | `api:8000` | FastAPI backend |
 | `git.ciagent.org` | `gitea:3000` | Self-hosted git (public read, admin-only write) |
+| `db.ciagent.org` | `adminer:8080` | Database viewer (any admin account, no separate password - see §7) |
 
 Cloudflare's proxy (orange-cloud DNS) hides the origin's real IP and absorbs generic bot/volumetric traffic; the app's own IP-based throttle/ban system (`app/services/ip_throttle_service.py`) handles the business-logic-specific abuse cases Cloudflare can't know about. Both need `TRUSTED_PROXY_IP_HEADER=CF-Connecting-IP` set correctly or IP-based logic breaks — see `KNOWN_LIMITATIONS.md`.
 
@@ -24,8 +25,8 @@ Cloudflare's proxy (orange-cloud DNS) hides the origin's real IP and absorbs gen
 
 ## 2. Cloudflare DNS + Origin CA certificate
 
-1. Add three DNS **A records**, all proxied (orange cloud): `ciagent.org`, `api.ciagent.org`, `git.ciagent.org` → the server's public IP.
-2. Cloudflare dashboard → SSL/TLS → **Origin Server** → Create Certificate. Cover `ciagent.org` and `*.ciagent.org` (one cert for all three subdomains), leave the default 15-year validity. Save the cert and private key.
+1. Add four DNS **A records**, all proxied (orange cloud): `ciagent.org`, `api.ciagent.org`, `git.ciagent.org`, `db.ciagent.org` → the server's public IP.
+2. Cloudflare dashboard → SSL/TLS → **Origin Server** → Create Certificate. Cover `ciagent.org` and `*.ciagent.org` (one cert for all four subdomains, including any added later), leave the default 15-year validity. Save the cert and private key.
 3. On the server, create `/etc/ci-agent/certs/` (outside the repo, never committed) and place the two files there as `cloudflare-origin.pem` and `cloudflare-origin.key` — this is exactly what `docker-compose.prod.yml`'s `nginx` service mounts.
 4. Cloudflare dashboard → SSL/TLS → set the encryption mode to **Full (strict)**. Anything less either skips origin verification or falls back to plaintext HTTP to the origin.
 
@@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ FRONTEND_URL=https://ciagent.org
 BACKEND_URL=https://api.ciagent.org
 NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL=https://api.ciagent.org
 NEXT_PUBLIC_GIT_REPO_URL=https://git.ciagent.org/<your-admin-username>/ci-agent
+NEXT_PUBLIC_DB_VIEWER_URL=https://db.ciagent.org
 TRUSTED_PROXY_IP_HEADER=CF-Connecting-IP
 RESEND_API_KEY=<real Resend key>          # no admin-UI equivalent for this one
 ```
@@ -97,7 +99,17 @@ Two ways to push, since Cloudflare's proxy only speaks HTTP(S) — raw SSH can't
 
 Read-only clone/browse works for anyone, no account: `https://git.ciagent.org/<you>/ci-agent.git` or the web UI directly.
 
-## 7. Post-boot: configure provider API keys via the Settings UI, not `.env`
+## 7. Database viewer (Adminer at db.ciagent.org)
+
+Unlike Gitea's admin account, there's no manual credential-handoff step for this one — any account with `is_admin=true` on the app itself can use it immediately, once `NEXT_PUBLIC_DB_VIEWER_URL` is set (§4) and the site is redeployed. Settings → Database → "Open database viewer" mints a short-lived token from the admin's real, live-checked login, which `db.ciagent.org`'s Nginx block (`infrastructure/nginx/nginx.conf`) exchanges for a signed session cookie via `apps/api/app/api/v1/db_viewer.py` — no separate password to generate, distribute, or rotate.
+
+A couple of things worth knowing:
+
+- Sessions last 60 minutes. Revoking someone's `is_admin` flag takes effect on their very next request through Nginx's `auth_request` check (it re-loads the user from the database each time), but an already-open Adminer tab isn't force-closed — it just stops being able to load anything new once that check runs again.
+- Adminer's own Postgres login (username/password) is a second, independent layer past this gate — real DB credentials are still required to actually view or edit anything.
+- An optional, commented-out IP-allowlist snippet is included in the `db.ciagent.org` Nginx block for admins with a static IP who want to require both the session *and* a matching source address — not enabled by default, since most admin connections don't have a stable IP to pin to.
+
+## 8. Post-boot: configure provider API keys via the Settings UI, not `.env`
 
 `scripts/bootstrap-env.sh` deliberately leaves these six blank. Sign in as the admin account and set them from the app itself:
 
@@ -106,7 +118,7 @@ Read-only clone/browse works for anyone, no account: `https://git.ciagent.org/<y
 
 Also set `LLM_PROVIDER=anthropic` and `SEARCH_PROVIDER=brave` in `.env` (restart `api`/`worker`/`beat` after) once you've configured the corresponding keys above — provider *selection* is still a deployment-level `.env` setting, only the key *values* moved to the UI.
 
-## 8. Updating the deployment
+## 9. Updating the deployment
 
 Manually:
 
@@ -115,8 +127,11 @@ git pull
 docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml build api worker beat web
 docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml run --rm api alembic upgrade head
 docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
+docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml restart nginx
 ```
 
+**The `restart nginx` step is not optional.** `up -d` only recreates the containers whose image/config changed - nginx's own image/config doesn't change on an app deploy, so it keeps running with the container IPs it resolved at its *own* last startup. Once `api`/`web` get rebuilt with new IPs, nginx keeps proxying to the old, now-dead ones until something forces it to re-resolve - every request 502s (and shows up in the browser as a misleading CORS error, since a bare 502 from nginx carries no `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` header). Confirmed live: this caused a real multi-hour outage. `scripts/auto-deploy.sh` includes this step automatically.
+
 **Or automatically**: `scripts/auto-deploy.sh` runs exactly that sequence, gated on "is `origin/master` ahead of `HEAD`" so it's a no-op most runs. Install it as a systemd timer (polls every 2 minutes — deliberately polling, not a Gitea webhook, so there's no extra exposed service, no Docker-socket-in-a-container, and no shared secret to manage):
 
 ```bash
@@ -128,7 +143,7 @@ systemctl enable --now ci-agent-deploy.timer
 
 Once running, pushing to `master` on Gitea is enough — the server picks it up within ~2 minutes, no manual SSH step needed. Check `journalctl -u ci-agent-deploy.service` to see deploy runs.
 
-## 9. Backups
+## 10. Backups
 
 Nothing backs itself up by default. At minimum, a nightly cron job on the host:
 
@@ -142,7 +157,7 @@ docker run --rm -v ci-agent-prod_gitea-data:/data -v /backups:/backup alpine \
 
 Copy `/backups` off-box (a Hetzner Storage Box via `rclone`, or any object storage) — local-only backups don't survive a lost disk. Retain a sane number of days and prune older ones.
 
-## 10. Operational notes
+## 11. Operational notes
 
 - `beat` must stay exactly one instance, always — duplicate scheduled monitoring runs otherwise. Don't `--scale beat=2`.
 - Docker's log driver is capped per-service (`max-size: 10m`, `max-file: 3` in `docker-compose.prod.yml`) — nothing else bounds log growth on the host.

KNOWN_LIMITATIONS.md

@@ -178,4 +178,11 @@ This file is updated as each phase lands. It exists so nothing is silently claim
 - **New `user_known_ips` table captures every distinct IP an account has signed in from** (`app/models/user_known_ip.py`), one row per `(user_id, ip_address)` pair with `first_seen_at`/`last_seen_at`, updated on every recorded sign-in (both real login and the local-dev bypass, gated by the same cooldown above for the latter). This is pure data capture for now - **nothing currently reads this table or surfaces it anywhere in the UI**; it exists as the foundation for a possible future "new device/location" security feature, per explicit request. `UserKnownIpRepository.record_login`'s return value (whether the IP was new) is already threaded through but currently unused by any caller.
 - **IPs were already being recorded per-login inside `user_security_events`** (every `login_success`/`login_failed` row has always carried `ip_address`) - `user_known_ips` doesn't replace that, it's a deliberately separate, deduplicated view: the security-events log is an append-only history of every attempt, while `user_known_ips` answers "what's the current set of IPs this account has ever used" without needing to scan and dedupe the (much larger, unbounded-growth - see the Phase 19 addendum above) events table.
 
+## Settings -> Database viewer (Adminer, local-dev/admin only)
+
+- **This feature deliberately does not reuse the app's own JWT/admin session to gate access, because it can't.** The frontend's access token lives only in `window.localStorage` (`apps/web/lib/api-client.ts`), never a cookie, and is attached only as a JS-constructed `Authorization` header on this app's own `fetch()` calls - a plain browser navigation to a different subdomain (`db.ciagent.org`) carries none of that. Instead, `apps/api/app/api/v1/db_viewer.py` mints a short-lived bootstrap token from a live, `require_admin`-gated session, which Nginx's `db.ciagent.org` block exchanges for an independent, cookie-based session scoped to that subdomain only. Both token types reuse the same `JWT_SECRET`/`TokenType` machinery as real login tokens (`apps/api/app/core/security.py`) rather than introducing a second signing secret.
+- **The `verify` endpoint re-loads the user and re-checks `is_admin` from the database on every request** (not just at token-mint time), so revoking someone's admin flag takes effect on their very next request through Nginx's `auth_request` - but a DB_VIEWER_SESSION cookie already issued is otherwise valid for its full 60-minute lifetime; there's no server-side session revocation list, only the live `is_admin` check and natural expiry.
+- **Local dev's Adminer (`docker-compose.yml`, port `127.0.0.1:8081`) has no authentication of its own at all** - it relies entirely on the port being bound to loopback only, matching this app's existing "loopback is inherently trusted" philosophy elsewhere (e.g. the local-dev auth bypass itself). Anyone who can reach `localhost:8081` on that machine - including another local user account on a shared machine - has full Postgres access with no further gate.
+- **Adminer itself has no read-only mode** - the feature was explicitly requested as "view and edit," so there's no additional restriction at the Adminer-config layer beyond Nginx's session gate (production) or loopback binding (local dev). The real Postgres username/password, required by Adminer's own login form, is the only remaining layer once past those.
+
 Further limitations are appended per-phase below.

apps/api/app/api/v1/admin.py

@@ -15,13 +15,14 @@ from app.core.security import get_client_ip
 from app.db.session import get_db
 from app.models.user import User
 from app.repositories.unban_request_repository import UnbanRequestRepository
+from app.schemas.auth import RequirePasswordChangeRequest
 from app.schemas.unban import (
     BanIpRequest,
     IpBanResponse,
     UnbanRequestPayload,
     UnbanRequestResponse,
 )
-from app.services import unban_service
+from app.services import auth_service, unban_service
 
 router = APIRouter(tags=["admin"])
 
@@ -89,3 +90,20 @@ async def reject_unban_request(
     _admin: User = Depends(require_admin),
 ) -> None:
     await unban_service.reject_unban_request(db, request_id)
+
+
+@router.post("/admin/users/require-password-change", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
+async def require_password_change(
+    request: Request,
+    payload: RequirePasswordChangeRequest,
+    settings: Settings = Depends(get_settings),
+    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+    _admin: User = Depends(require_admin),
+) -> None:
+    """Flags an account (by email) so its next request is blocked
+    everywhere except /auth/me, /auth/change-password, and /auth/logout
+    until they set a new password - see app.auth.dependencies.get_current_user
+    and app.services.auth_service.require_password_change. Meant for handing
+    a demo account to someone with a known sample password."""
+    client_ip = get_client_ip(request, settings)
+    await auth_service.require_password_change(db, client_ip, payload.email)

apps/api/app/api/v1/auth.py

@@ -14,7 +14,9 @@ from app.core.security import get_client_ip, is_localhost
 from app.db.session import get_db
 from app.models.user import LOCAL_DEV_USER_ID, User
 from app.schemas.auth import (
+    ChangePasswordRequest,
     ConfirmPasswordResetRequest,
+    DeleteAccountRequest,
     LoginRequest,
     LogoutRequest,
     RefreshRequest,
@@ -166,3 +168,24 @@ async def me(user: User = Depends(get_current_user)) -> MeResponse:
     effective_auth_mode = "local" if user.id == LOCAL_DEV_USER_ID else "jwt"
     base = UserResponse.model_validate(user).model_dump()
     return MeResponse(**base, auth_mode=effective_auth_mode)
+
+
+@router.delete("/me", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
+async def delete_account(
+    payload: DeleteAccountRequest,
+    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+    user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
+) -> None:
+    await auth_service.delete_account(db, user, payload.password)
+
+
+@router.post("/change-password", response_model=TokenResponse)
+async def change_password(
+    request: Request,
+    payload: ChangePasswordRequest,
+    settings: Settings = Depends(get_settings),
+    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+    user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
+) -> TokenResponse:
+    client_ip = get_client_ip(request, settings)
+    return await auth_service.change_password(db, settings, client_ip, user, payload)

apps/api/app/api/v1/db_viewer.py

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+"""Settings -> Database viewer: lets any admin open a web-based Postgres
+client (Adminer, at db.<domain>) without a separate, shared credential.
+
+The app's own JWT lives only in the browser's localStorage
+(apps/web/lib/api-client.ts) - never a cookie, never sent on a plain
+cross-subdomain navigation - so it can't gate a link to a different
+subdomain the way an in-app API call is gated. Instead: an admin mints a
+short-lived DB_VIEWER_BOOTSTRAP token from their real (live-checked) admin
+session; Nginx's db.<domain> /_auth route exchanges that, one-time, for a
+longer-lived DB_VIEWER_SESSION cookie scoped to that subdomain; Nginx's
+`auth_request` then re-validates that cookie - including a fresh `is_admin`
+check against the database - on every subsequent request. See
+infrastructure/nginx/nginx.conf's db.<domain> server block and
+DEPLOYMENT.md.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Query, Request, Response, status
+from fastapi.responses import RedirectResponse
+from pydantic import BaseModel
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.auth.dependencies import require_admin
+from app.core.config import Settings, get_settings
+from app.core.security import (
+    InvalidTokenError,
+    TokenType,
+    create_db_viewer_bootstrap_token,
+    create_db_viewer_session_token,
+    decode_token,
+    get_client_ip,
+)
+from app.db.session import get_db
+from app.models.enums import SecurityEventType
+from app.models.user import User
+from app.repositories.user_repository import UserRepository
+from app.repositories.user_security_event_repository import UserSecurityEventRepository
+
+router = APIRouter(prefix="/db-viewer", tags=["db-viewer"])
+
+SESSION_COOKIE_NAME = "db_viewer_session"
+
+
+class DbViewerSessionResponse(BaseModel):
+    token: str
+
+
+@router.post("/session", response_model=DbViewerSessionResponse)
+async def create_db_viewer_session(
+    request: Request,
+    settings: Settings = Depends(get_settings),
+    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+    admin: User = Depends(require_admin),
+) -> DbViewerSessionResponse:
+    """Mints a 2-minute bootstrap token the frontend embeds in a link to
+    https://<db-viewer-host>/_auth?token=... - Nginx proxies that path
+    straight to `bootstrap` below, which exchanges it for a session cookie."""
+    token = create_db_viewer_bootstrap_token(admin.id, settings)
+    await UserSecurityEventRepository(db).create(
+        user_id=admin.id,
+        event_type=SecurityEventType.DB_VIEWER_SESSION_CREATED,
+        ip_address=get_client_ip(request, settings),
+    )
+    await db.commit()
+    return DbViewerSessionResponse(token=token)
+
+
+@router.get("/bootstrap")
+async def bootstrap_db_viewer_session(
+    request: Request,
+    token: str = Query(...),
+    settings: Settings = Depends(get_settings),
+    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+) -> RedirectResponse:
+    """Reached only via Nginx's db.<domain> /_auth location - never called
+    directly by the frontend. No `require_admin` dependency: the bootstrap
+    token itself, freshly minted by `create_db_viewer_session` above, is the
+    credential here."""
+    try:
+        decoded = decode_token(token, settings, TokenType.DB_VIEWER_BOOTSTRAP)
+    except InvalidTokenError as exc:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="Invalid or expired token"
+        ) from exc
+
+    # Logged here, not at /session mint time, because this is the point the
+    # admin's browser actually completes the hand-off into Adminer - minting
+    # a token only proves they clicked the button, not that they got in.
+    await UserSecurityEventRepository(db).create(
+        user_id=decoded.user_id,
+        event_type=SecurityEventType.DB_VIEWER_ACCESSED,
+        ip_address=get_client_ip(request, settings),
+    )
+    await db.commit()
+
+    session_token = create_db_viewer_session_token(decoded.user_id, settings)
+    # Adminer's own driver dropdown defaults to MySQL, not Postgres - a bare
+    # "/" redirect leaves it selecting MySQL against a host that only speaks
+    # Postgres, producing a "Connection refused" error that has nothing to
+    # do with this app's own auth. `?pgsql=postgres` pre-selects the right
+    # driver and server (the internal Compose service name, same in dev and
+    # prod) - only the Postgres password itself is left for the admin to type.
+    response = RedirectResponse(url="/?pgsql=postgres", status_code=status.HTTP_302_FOUND)
+    response.set_cookie(
+        SESSION_COOKIE_NAME,
+        session_token,
+        max_age=60 * 60,
+        httponly=True,
+        secure=True,
+        samesite="lax",
+        # No `domain=` - defaults to the exact host (db.<domain>), not
+        # shared with ciagent.org/api.ciagent.org/git.ciagent.org.
+    )
+    return response
+
+
+@router.get("/verify")
+async def verify_db_viewer_session(
+    request: Request,
+    settings: Settings = Depends(get_settings),
+    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+) -> Response:
+    """Reached only via Nginx's `auth_request` subrequest (internal `/_verify`
+    location) - carries just the forwarded Cookie header, no Authorization.
+    Re-checks `is_admin` fresh from the database on every call, not just at
+    token-mint time, so revoking an admin takes effect on their very next
+    request here - same live-check behavior as `require_admin` elsewhere."""
+    token = request.cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME)
+    if token is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="No session")
+
+    try:
+        decoded = decode_token(token, settings, TokenType.DB_VIEWER_SESSION)
+    except InvalidTokenError as exc:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid or expired session"
+        ) from exc
+
+    user = await UserRepository(db).get_by_id(decoded.user_id)
+    if user is None or not user.is_admin:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Admin privileges required"
+        )
+
+    return Response(status_code=status.HTTP_200_OK)

apps/api/app/api/v1/router.py

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from app.api.v1 import (
     auth,
     companies,
     dashboard,
+    db_viewer,
     monitoring,
     notification_destinations,
     reports,
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ api_v1_router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1")
 api_v1_router.include_router(system.router)
 api_v1_router.include_router(auth.router)
 api_v1_router.include_router(admin.router)
+api_v1_router.include_router(db_viewer.router)
 api_v1_router.include_router(user_api_keys.router)
 api_v1_router.include_router(companies.router)
 api_v1_router.include_router(notification_destinations.router)

apps/api/app/auth/dependencies.py

@@ -29,6 +29,15 @@ from app.models.user import User
 from app.repositories.user_repository import UserRepository
 from app.services.auth_service import get_or_create_local_user
 
+# Everything an account with must_change_password=True can still reach -
+# just enough to discover the flag (/me), fix it (/change-password), and
+# bail out (/logout, which doesn't even route through get_current_user but
+# is listed for clarity). Every other endpoint 403s until they change it -
+# see app.services.auth_service.require_password_change.
+_PASSWORD_CHANGE_EXEMPT_PATHS = frozenset(
+    {"/api/v1/auth/me", "/api/v1/auth/change-password", "/api/v1/auth/logout"}
+)
+
 
 async def get_current_user(
     request: Request,
@@ -58,6 +67,11 @@ async def get_current_user(
             status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
             detail="Invalid or expired access token",
         )
+    if user.must_change_password and request.url.path not in _PASSWORD_CHANGE_EXEMPT_PATHS:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+            detail="Password change required",
+        )
     return user
 
 

apps/api/app/core/security.py

@@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ def verify_password(raw_password: str, password_hash: str) -> bool:
 class TokenType(StrEnum):
     ACCESS = "access"
     REFRESH = "refresh"
+    # Settings -> Database viewer: a short-lived token minted from a live
+    # admin session, exchanged (via Nginx's db.ciagent.org /_auth route) for
+    # a longer-lived DB_VIEWER_SESSION cookie. See app/api/v1/db_viewer.py.
+    DB_VIEWER_BOOTSTRAP = "db_viewer_bootstrap"
+    DB_VIEWER_SESSION = "db_viewer_session"
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -105,6 +110,14 @@ def create_refresh_token(user_id: uuid.UUID, settings: Settings) -> tuple[str, s
     return token, jti, expires_at
 
 
+def create_db_viewer_bootstrap_token(user_id: uuid.UUID, settings: Settings) -> str:
+    return _encode_token(user_id, TokenType.DB_VIEWER_BOOTSTRAP, timedelta(minutes=2), settings)
+
+
+def create_db_viewer_session_token(user_id: uuid.UUID, settings: Settings) -> str:
+    return _encode_token(user_id, TokenType.DB_VIEWER_SESSION, timedelta(minutes=60), settings)
+
+
 def _encode_token(
     user_id: uuid.UUID,
     token_type: TokenType,

apps/api/app/models/enums.py

@@ -153,6 +153,10 @@ class SecurityEventType(StrEnum):
     EMAIL_VERIFIED = "email_verified"
     SERVER_SECRET_UPDATED = "server_secret_updated"
     API_KEY_UPDATED = "api_key_updated"
+    DB_VIEWER_SESSION_CREATED = "db_viewer_session_created"
+    DB_VIEWER_ACCESSED = "db_viewer_accessed"
+    PASSWORD_CHANGED = "password_changed"
+    PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED = "password_change_required"
 
 
 class ApiKeyProvider(StrEnum):

apps/api/app/models/user.py

@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@ class User(Base, UUIDPrimaryKeyMixin, TimestampMixin):
     failed_login_count: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, default=0)
     locked_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
 
+    # Admin-forced reset (e.g. before handing a demo account to someone) -
+    # see app.auth.dependencies.get_current_user, which blocks every
+    # endpoint except /auth/me, /auth/change-password, and /auth/logout
+    # while this is true.
+    must_change_password: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, default=False)
+
     refresh_tokens: Mapped[list[RefreshToken]] = relationship(
         back_populates="user", cascade="all, delete-orphan"
     )

apps/api/app/repositories/user_repository.py

@@ -23,6 +23,13 @@ class UserRepository:
         result = await self.db.execute(select(User.email).where(User.is_admin.is_(True)))
         return list(result.scalars().all())
 
+    async def delete(self, user: User) -> None:
+        """Cascades (ON DELETE CASCADE, see migrations) to every row the
+        user owns - companies and everything under them, refresh tokens,
+        security events, etc. Irreversible."""
+        await self.db.delete(user)
+        await self.db.flush()
+
     async def create(
         self,
         *,

apps/api/app/schemas/auth.py

@@ -73,6 +73,24 @@ class ConfirmPasswordResetRequest(BaseModel):
         return _validate_password_strength(value)
 
 
+class DeleteAccountRequest(BaseModel):
+    password: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=128)
+
+
+class ChangePasswordRequest(BaseModel):
+    current_password: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=128)
+    new_password: str = Field(min_length=10, max_length=128)
+
+    @field_validator("new_password")
+    @classmethod
+    def _password_strength(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        return _validate_password_strength(value)
+
+
+class RequirePasswordChangeRequest(BaseModel):
+    email: EmailStr
+
+
 class SecurityEventResponse(BaseModel):
     event_type: str
     ip_address: str

apps/api/app/schemas/user.py

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ class UserResponse(BaseModel):
     timezone: str
     is_active: bool
     is_admin: bool
+    must_change_password: bool
 
 
 class MeResponse(UserResponse):

apps/api/app/services/auth_service.py

@@ -13,7 +13,13 @@ from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.core.config import Settings
-from app.core.errors import AuthenticationError, ConflictError, ThrottledError, ValidationAppError
+from app.core.errors import (
+    AuthenticationError,
+    ConflictError,
+    NotFoundError,
+    ThrottledError,
+    ValidationAppError,
+)
 from app.core.security import (
     InvalidTokenError,
     TokenType,
@@ -37,6 +43,7 @@ from app.repositories.user_known_ip_repository import UserKnownIpRepository
 from app.repositories.user_repository import UserRepository
 from app.repositories.user_security_event_repository import UserSecurityEventRepository
 from app.schemas.auth import (
+    ChangePasswordRequest,
     ConfirmPasswordResetRequest,
     LoginRequest,
     RegisterRequest,
@@ -426,3 +433,75 @@ async def list_security_events(db: AsyncSession, user_id: uuid.UUID) -> list[Use
     """The calling user's own security activity - the user-facing
     counterpart to the admin-only app-wide log feed (core/logging.py)."""
     return await UserSecurityEventRepository(db).list_for_user(user_id)
+
+
+async def delete_account(db: AsyncSession, user: User, password: str) -> None:
+    """Permanently deletes the account and, via ON DELETE CASCADE foreign
+    keys (see migrations), everything it owns - companies and everything
+    under them, refresh tokens, security events, API keys, etc. There is no
+    soft-delete or recovery path. Rejected for accounts with no
+    password_hash (the fixed AUTH_MODE=local user) - there's nothing to
+    verify the caller's identity against."""
+    if user.password_hash is None:
+        raise ValidationAppError("Account deletion isn't available for this account.")
+    if not verify_password(password, user.password_hash):
+        raise AuthenticationError("Incorrect password")
+    await UserRepository(db).delete(user)
+    await db.commit()
+
+
+async def change_password(
+    db: AsyncSession,
+    settings: Settings,
+    client_ip: str,
+    user: User,
+    payload: ChangePasswordRequest,
+) -> TokenResponse:
+    """Authenticated in-app password change - distinct from
+    confirm_password_reset (which is the emailed-code flow for someone who
+    can't log in at all). Also the only way to clear must_change_password,
+    the admin-forced-reset flag (see require_password_change below)."""
+    if user.password_hash is None:
+        raise ValidationAppError("This account doesn't use password sign-in.")
+    if not verify_password(payload.current_password, user.password_hash):
+        raise AuthenticationError("Incorrect current password")
+
+    history_repo = PasswordHistoryRepository(db)
+    previous_hashes = await history_repo.list_hashes_for_user(user.id)
+    previous_hashes.append(user.password_hash)
+    if any(verify_password(payload.new_password, h) for h in previous_hashes):
+        raise ValidationAppError("You've used this password before. Choose a different one.")
+
+    await history_repo.add(user_id=user.id, password_hash=user.password_hash)
+    user.password_hash = hash_password(payload.new_password)
+    user.must_change_password = False
+
+    # Rotate every session, including the one making this request - the
+    # fresh token pair returned below replaces it immediately, so the
+    # caller keeps working without a forced re-login.
+    await RefreshTokenRepository(db).revoke_all_for_user(user.id)
+    await UserSecurityEventRepository(db).create(
+        user_id=user.id, event_type=SecurityEventType.PASSWORD_CHANGED, ip_address=client_ip
+    )
+    return await _issue_token_pair(db, settings, user)
+
+
+async def require_password_change(db: AsyncSession, client_ip: str, email: str) -> User:
+    """Admin action: flags an account so its next request is blocked
+    everywhere except /auth/me, /auth/change-password, and /auth/logout
+    (enforced in app.auth.dependencies.get_current_user) until they set a
+    new password. Meant for handing a demo account to someone with a known
+    sample password."""
+    user = await UserRepository(db).get_by_email(email)
+    if user is None:
+        raise NotFoundError("No account with that email")
+    if user.password_hash is None:
+        raise ValidationAppError("This account doesn't use password sign-in.")
+    user.must_change_password = True
+    await UserSecurityEventRepository(db).create(
+        user_id=user.id,
+        event_type=SecurityEventType.PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED,
+        ip_address=client_ip,
+    )
+    await db.commit()
+    return user

apps/api/migrations/versions/9e6c80c11da7_add_must_change_password_to_users.py

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+"""add must_change_password to users
+
+Revision ID: 9e6c80c11da7
+Revises: c34c769afc07
+Create Date: 2026-08-06 03:10:00.000000
+
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections.abc import Sequence
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+
+revision: str = "9e6c80c11da7"
+down_revision: str | None = "c34c769afc07"
+branch_labels: Sequence[str] | str | None = None
+depends_on: Sequence[str] | str | None = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    op.add_column(
+        "users",
+        sa.Column(
+            "must_change_password", sa.Boolean(), nullable=False, server_default=sa.false()
+        ),
+    )
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.drop_column("users", "must_change_password")

apps/api/tests/unit/test_account_management.py

@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+"""Account deletion (DELETE /auth/me) and admin-forced password change
+(POST /admin/users/require-password-change -> POST /auth/change-password,
+enforced by app.auth.dependencies.get_current_user)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import uuid
+
+from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.models.enums import SecurityEventType
+from app.repositories.user_repository import UserRepository
+from app.repositories.user_security_event_repository import UserSecurityEventRepository
+
+
+def _unique_email() -> str:
+    return f"user-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]}@example.com"
+
+
+def _register_and_login(client: TestClient, password: str = "correct-horse-1") -> dict:
+    email = _unique_email()
+    client.post(
+        "/api/v1/auth/register",
+        json={"email": email, "password": password, "display_name": "T"},
+    )
+    tokens = client.post("/api/v1/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": password}).json()
+    return {"email": email, "headers": {"Authorization": f"Bearer {tokens['access_token']}"}}
+
+
+async def _register_admin_and_login(client: TestClient, db_session: AsyncSession) -> dict[str, str]:
+    email = f"admin-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]}@example.com"
+    client.post(
+        "/api/v1/auth/register",
+        json={"email": email, "password": "correct-horse-1", "display_name": "Admin"},
+    )
+    user = await UserRepository(db_session).get_by_email(email)
+    user.is_admin = True
+    await db_session.commit()
+    tokens = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": "correct-horse-1"}
+    ).json()
+    return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {tokens['access_token']}"}
+
+
+# --- DELETE /auth/me -------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_delete_account_requires_auth(client: TestClient):
+    resp = client.request(
+        "DELETE", "/api/v1/auth/me", json={"password": "whatever"}
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_delete_account_rejects_wrong_password(client: TestClient):
+    account = _register_and_login(client)
+    resp = client.request(
+        "DELETE",
+        "/api/v1/auth/me",
+        json={"password": "not-the-right-password"},
+        headers=account["headers"],
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_delete_account_succeeds_with_correct_password_and_logs_out_the_account(
+    client: TestClient,
+):
+    account = _register_and_login(client)
+    resp = client.request(
+        "DELETE",
+        "/api/v1/auth/me",
+        json={"password": "correct-horse-1"},
+        headers=account["headers"],
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 204
+
+    # The account is gone - the same token no longer resolves to anyone.
+    me_resp = client.get("/api/v1/auth/me", headers=account["headers"])
+    assert me_resp.status_code == 401
+
+    # And a fresh login attempt with the same credentials fails too.
+    login_resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/auth/login",
+        json={"email": account["email"], "password": "correct-horse-1"},
+    )
+    assert login_resp.status_code == 401
+
+
+async def test_delete_account_cascades_to_owned_data(client: TestClient, db_session: AsyncSession):
+    """A company created by the account must be gone too (ON DELETE CASCADE),
+    not just the user row."""
+    account = _register_and_login(client)
+    create_resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/companies",
+        json={"name": f"Co-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}", "official_website": None},
+        headers=account["headers"],
+    )
+    assert create_resp.status_code == 201
+    company_id = create_resp.json()["id"]
+
+    client.request(
+        "DELETE", "/api/v1/auth/me", json={"password": "correct-horse-1"}, headers=account["headers"]
+    )
+
+    from sqlalchemy import text
+
+    row = await db_session.execute(
+        text("SELECT 1 FROM companies WHERE id = :id"), {"id": company_id}
+    )
+    assert row.first() is None
+
+
+# --- POST /admin/users/require-password-change -----------------------------
+
+
+def test_require_password_change_requires_admin(client: TestClient):
+    account = _register_and_login(client)
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/admin/users/require-password-change",
+        json={"email": account["email"]},
+        headers=account["headers"],
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+
+async def test_require_password_change_rejects_unknown_email(
+    client: TestClient, db_session: AsyncSession
+):
+    headers = await _register_admin_and_login(client, db_session)
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/admin/users/require-password-change",
+        json={"email": "[email protected]"},
+        headers=headers,
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 404
+
+
+async def test_admin_flags_an_account_and_it_gets_logged_to_the_targets_activity(
+    client: TestClient, db_session: AsyncSession
+):
+    """Checked directly against the DB, not via GET /auth/security-events -
+    that endpoint isn't in the must-change-password exempt list, so the
+    just-flagged account can't reach it until they change their password
+    (see test_flagged_account_is_blocked_from_other_endpoints)."""
+    admin_headers = await _register_admin_and_login(client, db_session)
+    account = _register_and_login(client)
+
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/admin/users/require-password-change",
+        json={"email": account["email"]},
+        headers=admin_headers,
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 204
+
+    user = await UserRepository(db_session).get_by_email(account["email"])
+    assert user.must_change_password is True
+    events = await UserSecurityEventRepository(db_session).list_for_user(user.id)
+    assert any(e.event_type == SecurityEventType.PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED for e in events)
+
+
+# --- Enforcement gate: everything except me/change-password/logout 403s ----
+
+
+async def test_flagged_account_is_blocked_from_other_endpoints(
+    client: TestClient, db_session: AsyncSession
+):
+    admin_headers = await _register_admin_and_login(client, db_session)
+    account = _register_and_login(client)
+    client.post(
+        "/api/v1/admin/users/require-password-change",
+        json={"email": account["email"]},
+        headers=admin_headers,
+    )
+
+    blocked = client.get("/api/v1/companies", headers=account["headers"])
+    assert blocked.status_code == 403
+
+    still_ok = client.get("/api/v1/auth/me", headers=account["headers"])
+    assert still_ok.status_code == 200
+    assert still_ok.json()["must_change_password"] is True
+
+
+async def test_change_password_clears_the_flag_and_unblocks_the_account(
+    client: TestClient, db_session: AsyncSession
+):
+    admin_headers = await _register_admin_and_login(client, db_session)
+    account = _register_and_login(client)
+    client.post(
+        "/api/v1/admin/users/require-password-change",
+        json={"email": account["email"]},
+        headers=admin_headers,
+    )
+
+    change_resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/auth/change-password",
+        json={"current_password": "correct-horse-1", "new_password": "brand-new-horse-2"},
+        headers=account["headers"],
+    )
+    assert change_resp.status_code == 200
+    new_tokens = change_resp.json()
+    new_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {new_tokens['access_token']}"}
+
+    me_resp = client.get("/api/v1/auth/me", headers=new_headers)
+    assert me_resp.status_code == 200
+    assert me_resp.json()["must_change_password"] is False
+
+    unblocked = client.get("/api/v1/companies", headers=new_headers)
+    assert unblocked.status_code == 200
+
+    # The new password actually works on a fresh login.
+    login_resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/auth/login",
+        json={"email": account["email"], "password": "brand-new-horse-2"},
+    )
+    assert login_resp.status_code == 200
+
+
+def test_change_password_rejects_wrong_current_password(client: TestClient):
+    account = _register_and_login(client)
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/auth/change-password",
+        json={"current_password": "totally-wrong", "new_password": "brand-new-horse-2"},
+        headers=account["headers"],
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_change_password_rejects_reusing_the_current_password(client: TestClient):
+    account = _register_and_login(client)
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/auth/change-password",
+        json={"current_password": "correct-horse-1", "new_password": "correct-horse-1"},
+        headers=account["headers"],
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 400
+
+
+def test_change_password_revokes_the_old_refresh_token(client: TestClient):
+    email = _unique_email()
+    client.post(
+        "/api/v1/auth/register",
+        json={"email": email, "password": "correct-horse-1", "display_name": "T"},
+    )
+    tokens = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": "correct-horse-1"}
+    ).json()
+    headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {tokens['access_token']}"}
+
+    client.post(
+        "/api/v1/auth/change-password",
+        json={"current_password": "correct-horse-1", "new_password": "brand-new-horse-2"},
+        headers=headers,
+    )
+
+    stale_refresh_resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/auth/refresh", json={"refresh_token": tokens["refresh_token"]}
+    )
+    assert stale_refresh_resp.status_code == 401

apps/api/tests/unit/test_db_viewer.py

@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+"""Settings -> Database viewer: mint (admin-gated) -> bootstrap (token ->
+session cookie) -> verify (cookie -> live is_admin check) round trip.
+
+Cookies are extracted from Set-Cookie headers and passed explicitly on
+follow-up requests rather than relying on TestClient's cookie jar - the
+session cookie is marked Secure, and TestClient's base_url is plain http,
+so a real cookie jar wouldn't resend it anyway."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import uuid
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+
+import jwt
+from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.core.config import get_settings
+from app.repositories.user_repository import UserRepository
+
+
+def _unique_email() -> str:
+    return f"user-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]}@example.com"
+
+
+async def _register_admin_and_login(client: TestClient, db_session: AsyncSession) -> dict[str, str]:
+    email = f"admin-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]}@example.com"
+    client.post(
+        "/api/v1/auth/register",
+        json={"email": email, "password": "correct-horse-1", "display_name": "Admin"},
+    )
+    user = await UserRepository(db_session).get_by_email(email)
+    user.is_admin = True
+    await db_session.commit()
+    tokens = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": "correct-horse-1"}
+    ).json()
+    return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {tokens['access_token']}"}
+
+
+async def _register_non_admin_and_login(client: TestClient) -> dict[str, str]:
+    email = _unique_email()
+    client.post(
+        "/api/v1/auth/register",
+        json={"email": email, "password": "correct-horse-1", "display_name": "T"},
+    )
+    tokens = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": "correct-horse-1"}
+    ).json()
+    return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {tokens['access_token']}"}
+
+
+def _extract_cookie(set_cookie_header: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    first_pair = set_cookie_header.split(";", 1)[0]
+    name, value = first_pair.split("=", 1)
+    return name, value
+
+
+# --- /db-viewer/session (mint) --------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_create_session_requires_auth(client: TestClient):
+    resp = client.post("/api/v1/db-viewer/session")
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+
+
+async def test_create_session_non_admin_forbidden(client: TestClient):
+    headers = await _register_non_admin_and_login(client)
+    resp = client.post("/api/v1/db-viewer/session", headers=headers)
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+
+async def test_admin_can_mint_a_bootstrap_token(client: TestClient, db_session: AsyncSession):
+    headers = await _register_admin_and_login(client, db_session)
+    resp = client.post("/api/v1/db-viewer/session", headers=headers)
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.json()["token"]
+
+
+async def test_minting_a_session_is_logged_to_the_admins_account_activity(
+    client: TestClient, db_session: AsyncSession
+):
+    headers = await _register_admin_and_login(client, db_session)
+    client.post("/api/v1/db-viewer/session", headers=headers)
+
+    events = client.get("/api/v1/auth/security-events", headers=headers).json()
+    assert any(e["event_type"] == "db_viewer_session_created" for e in events)
+
+
+# --- /db-viewer/bootstrap (token -> cookie) -------------------------------
+
+
+async def test_bootstrap_with_a_valid_token_sets_a_session_cookie_and_redirects(
+    client: TestClient, db_session: AsyncSession
+):
+    headers = await _register_admin_and_login(client, db_session)
+    token = client.post("/api/v1/db-viewer/session", headers=headers).json()["token"]
+
+    resp = client.get(
+        "/api/v1/db-viewer/bootstrap", params={"token": token}, follow_redirects=False
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 302
+    assert resp.headers["location"] == "/?pgsql=postgres"
+    assert "db_viewer_session" in resp.headers["set-cookie"]
+    assert "HttpOnly" in resp.headers["set-cookie"]
+    assert "Secure" in resp.headers["set-cookie"]
+
+
+async def test_bootstrap_success_is_logged_to_the_admins_account_activity(
+    client: TestClient, db_session: AsyncSession
+):
+    headers = await _register_admin_and_login(client, db_session)
+    token = client.post("/api/v1/db-viewer/session", headers=headers).json()["token"]
+
+    client.get("/api/v1/db-viewer/bootstrap", params={"token": token}, follow_redirects=False)
+
+    events = client.get("/api/v1/auth/security-events", headers=headers).json()
+    assert any(e["event_type"] == "db_viewer_accessed" for e in events)
+
+
+def test_bootstrap_rejects_a_garbage_token(client: TestClient):
+    resp = client.get(
+        "/api/v1/db-viewer/bootstrap", params={"token": "not-a-real-token"}, follow_redirects=False
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+
+def test_bootstrap_rejects_an_expired_token(client: TestClient):
+    settings = get_settings()
+    now = datetime.now(UTC)
+    expired_token = jwt.encode(
+        {
+            "sub": str(uuid.uuid4()),
+            "type": "db_viewer_bootstrap",
+            "iat": now - timedelta(minutes=10),
+            "exp": now - timedelta(minutes=5),
+            "jti": "x",
+        },
+        settings.jwt_secret,
+        algorithm="HS256",
+    )
+    resp = client.get(
+        "/api/v1/db-viewer/bootstrap", params={"token": expired_token}, follow_redirects=False
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+
+def test_bootstrap_rejects_a_session_type_token_used_as_a_bootstrap_token(client: TestClient):
+    """Type confusion guard: a DB_VIEWER_SESSION token must not work as a
+    DB_VIEWER_BOOTSTRAP token, even though both are signed with the same
+    jwt_secret."""
+    settings = get_settings()
+    now = datetime.now(UTC)
+    session_typed_token = jwt.encode(
+        {
+            "sub": str(uuid.uuid4()),
+            "type": "db_viewer_session",
+            "iat": now,
+            "exp": now + timedelta(minutes=2),
+            "jti": "x",
+        },
+        settings.jwt_secret,
+        algorithm="HS256",
+    )
+    resp = client.get(
+        "/api/v1/db-viewer/bootstrap",
+        params={"token": session_typed_token},
+        follow_redirects=False,
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+
+# --- /db-viewer/verify (cookie -> live is_admin check) --------------------
+
+
+async def test_verify_succeeds_for_a_live_admin_with_a_valid_session_cookie(
+    client: TestClient, db_session: AsyncSession
+):
+    headers = await _register_admin_and_login(client, db_session)
+    token = client.post("/api/v1/db-viewer/session", headers=headers).json()["token"]
+    bootstrap_resp = client.get(
+        "/api/v1/db-viewer/bootstrap", params={"token": token}, follow_redirects=False
+    )
+    cookie_name, cookie_value = _extract_cookie(bootstrap_resp.headers["set-cookie"])
+
+    verify_resp = client.get("/api/v1/db-viewer/verify", cookies={cookie_name: cookie_value})
+    assert verify_resp.status_code == 200
+
+
+def test_verify_rejects_a_missing_cookie(client: TestClient):
+    resp = client.get("/api/v1/db-viewer/verify")
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+
+
+async def test_verify_rejects_a_session_cookie_once_admin_is_revoked(
+    client: TestClient, db_session: AsyncSession
+):
+    headers = await _register_admin_and_login(client, db_session)
+    token = client.post("/api/v1/db-viewer/session", headers=headers).json()["token"]
+    bootstrap_resp = client.get(
+        "/api/v1/db-viewer/bootstrap", params={"token": token}, follow_redirects=False
+    )
+    cookie_name, cookie_value = _extract_cookie(bootstrap_resp.headers["set-cookie"])
+
+    # Sanity: still works before revocation.
+    assert (
+        client.get("/api/v1/db-viewer/verify", cookies={cookie_name: cookie_value}).status_code
+        == 200
+    )
+
+    admin_email_resp = client.get("/api/v1/auth/me", headers=headers)
+    admin = await UserRepository(db_session).get_by_email(admin_email_resp.json()["email"])
+    admin.is_admin = False
+    await db_session.commit()
+
+    assert (
+        client.get("/api/v1/db-viewer/verify", cookies={cookie_name: cookie_value}).status_code
+        == 401
+    )

apps/web/app/(app)/layout.tsx

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ export default function DashboardLayout({ children }: { children: React.ReactNod
   const logout = useLogout();
 
   const requiresLogin = systemStatus ? !isLocalConvenience(systemStatus) : false;
+  const mustChangePassword = user?.must_change_password ?? false;
 
   useEffect(() => {
     if (requiresLogin && !isLoading && isError) {
@@ -22,6 +23,12 @@ export default function DashboardLayout({ children }: { children: React.ReactNod
     }
   }, [requiresLogin, isLoading, isError, router]);
 
+  useEffect(() => {
+    if (mustChangePassword) {
+      router.replace("/change-password");
+    }
+  }, [mustChangePassword, router]);
+
   if (requiresLogin && (isLoading || isError)) {
     return (
       <div className="flex min-h-screen items-center justify-center text-sm text-slate-500">
@@ -30,6 +37,17 @@ export default function DashboardLayout({ children }: { children: React.ReactNod
     );
   }
 
+  // Every API call except /auth/me, /auth/change-password, and /auth/logout
+  // 403s server-side while this is set (app/auth/dependencies.py) - this is
+  // just the matching frontend redirect, not the actual enforcement.
+  if (mustChangePassword) {
+    return (
+      <div className="flex min-h-screen items-center justify-center text-sm text-slate-500">
+        Redirecting…
+      </div>
+    );
+  }
+
   return (
     <div className="min-h-screen bg-slate-50">
       <LocalModeBanner />

apps/web/app/(app)/settings/page.tsx

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { useState } from "react";
 import {
   Bell,
   CheckCircle2,
+  Database,
   KeyRound,
   Loader2,
   Mail,
@@ -24,8 +25,10 @@ import {
 import { authErrorMessage } from "@/hooks/use-auth";
 import {
   useAcceptUnbanRequest,
+  useCreateDbViewerSession,
   useCreateIpBan,
   useCurrentUser,
+  useDeleteAccount,
   useDeleteIpBan,
   useIpBans,
   useRejectUnbanRequest,
@@ -48,6 +51,7 @@ import { FormField } from "@/components/ui/form-field";
 import { Select } from "@/components/ui/select";
 import { SystemSecretRow } from "@/components/ui/system-secret-row";
 import { UserApiKeyRow } from "@/components/ui/user-api-key-row";
+import { isLocalConvenience } from "@/lib/auth";
 import { formatDateTime } from "@/lib/format";
 import {
   SEVERITY_LABELS,
@@ -663,6 +667,119 @@ function IpBansBox() {
   );
 }
 
+function DatabaseViewerBox() {
+  const { data: systemStatus } = useSystemStatus();
+  const createSession = useCreateDbViewerSession();
+  const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
+  const isLocal = systemStatus ? isLocalConvenience(systemStatus) : false;
+  const dbViewerUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_DB_VIEWER_URL;
+
+  const handleOpen = async () => {
+    setError(null);
+    try {
+      const { token } = await createSession.mutateAsync();
+      window.open(`${dbViewerUrl}/_auth?token=${encodeURIComponent(token)}`, "_blank", "noopener,noreferrer");
+    } catch {
+      setError("Couldn't open the database viewer. Try again.");
+    }
+  };
+
+  return (
+    <div className="rounded-lg border border-slate-200 bg-white p-6">
+      <div className="flex items-center gap-2 text-sm font-semibold text-slate-700">
+        <Database className="h-4 w-4" aria-hidden /> Database
+      </div>
+      <p className="mt-1 text-sm text-slate-500">
+        Open a web-based Postgres client (Adminer) in a new tab to view and edit rows directly.
+        PostgreSQL is pre-selected - just enter the database password to sign in. Local developers
+        and server admins only.
+      </p>
+
+      <div className="mt-4">
+        {isLocal ? (
+          <a
+            href="http://localhost:8081/?pgsql=postgres&username=ciagent"
+            target="_blank"
+            rel="noopener noreferrer"
+            className="focus-ring inline-flex items-center gap-1.5 rounded-md bg-slate-800 px-3 py-1.5 text-xs font-semibold text-white transition-colors duration-200 hover:bg-slate-900"
+          >
+            <Database className="h-3.5 w-3.5" aria-hidden /> Open database viewer
+          </a>
+        ) : dbViewerUrl ? (
+          <ActionButton
+            onClick={handleOpen}
+            pending={createSession.isPending}
+            colorClass="bg-slate-800 hover:bg-slate-900"
+            icon={Database}
+            label="Open database viewer"
+          />
+        ) : (
+          <p className="text-sm text-slate-500">Not configured for this deployment.</p>
+        )}
+        {error && <p className="mt-2 text-xs text-red-600">{error}</p>}
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  );
+}
+
+function DeleteAccountBox() {
+  const { data: systemStatus } = useSystemStatus();
+  const [password, setPassword] = useState("");
+  const deleteAccount = useDeleteAccount();
+  const isLocal = systemStatus ? isLocalConvenience(systemStatus) : false;
+
+  // The local-dev bypass account has no password_hash at all (it never
+  // registers/logs in) - there's nothing to type to confirm deletion, and
+  // deleting it would just get silently re-created on the next request.
+  if (isLocal) return null;
+
+  return (
+    <div className="rounded-lg border border-red-200 bg-red-50 p-6">
+      <div className="flex items-center gap-2 text-sm font-semibold text-red-700">
+        <Trash2 className="h-4 w-4" aria-hidden /> Delete account
+      </div>
+      <p className="mt-1 text-sm text-red-700/80">
+        Permanently deletes your account and everything in it - companies, monitoring history,
+        reports, and API keys. This can&apos;t be undone.
+      </p>
+      <form
+        onSubmit={(e) => {
+          e.preventDefault();
+          deleteAccount.mutate({ password });
+        }}
+        className="mt-4 flex flex-wrap items-end gap-2"
+      >
+        <div className="min-w-[220px] flex-1">
+          <label htmlFor="delete-account-password" className="block text-sm font-medium text-red-700">
+            Confirm your password
+          </label>
+          <input
+            id="delete-account-password"
+            type="password"
+            autoComplete="current-password"
+            value={password}
+            onChange={(e) => setPassword(e.target.value)}
+            className="focus-ring mt-1 block w-full rounded-md border border-red-300 px-3 py-2 text-sm text-slate-900 shadow-sm transition-colors duration-150"
+          />
+        </div>
+        <button
+          type="submit"
+          disabled={!password || deleteAccount.isPending}
+          className="focus-ring inline-flex shrink-0 items-center gap-1.5 rounded-md bg-red-600 px-3 py-2 text-sm font-semibold text-white transition-colors duration-200 hover:bg-red-700 disabled:cursor-not-allowed disabled:opacity-50"
+        >
+          {deleteAccount.isPending && <Loader2 className="h-4 w-4 animate-spin" aria-hidden />}
+          {deleteAccount.isPending ? "Deleting…" : "Delete account"}
+        </button>
+      </form>
+      {deleteAccount.isError && (
+        <p className="mt-2 text-sm text-red-700" role="alert">
+          {authErrorMessage(deleteAccount.error)}
+        </p>
+      )}
+    </div>
+  );
+}
+
 export default function SettingsPage() {
   const { data: user } = useCurrentUser();
   const { data: systemStatus } = useSystemStatus();
@@ -759,9 +876,12 @@ export default function SettingsPage() {
         <>
           <ServerSecretsBox />
           <IpBansBox />
+          <DatabaseViewerBox />
           <LoggingBox />
         </>
       )}
+
+      <DeleteAccountBox />
     </div>
   );
 }

apps/web/app/change-password/page.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+"use client";
+
+import { zodResolver } from "@hookform/resolvers/zod";
+import { useRouter } from "next/navigation";
+import { useForm } from "react-hook-form";
+import { KeyRound, Loader2 } from "lucide-react";
+import { z } from "zod";
+import { PasswordField } from "@/components/ui/password-field";
+import { PasswordStrengthMeter } from "@/components/ui/password-strength-meter";
+import { authErrorMessage, useChangePassword } from "@/hooks/use-auth";
+
+const changePasswordSchema = z.object({
+  currentPassword: z.string().min(1, "Enter your current password"),
+  newPassword: z
+    .string()
+    .min(10, "Must be at least 10 characters")
+    .refine((v) => /[a-zA-Z]/.test(v) && /\d/.test(v), {
+      message: "Must contain at least one letter and one digit",
+    }),
+});
+
+type ChangePasswordForm = z.infer<typeof changePasswordSchema>;
+
+export default function ChangePasswordPage() {
+  const router = useRouter();
+  const changePassword = useChangePassword();
+  const {
+    register,
+    handleSubmit,
+    watch,
+    formState: { errors },
+  } = useForm<ChangePasswordForm>({ resolver: zodResolver(changePasswordSchema) });
+
+  const onSubmit = handleSubmit(async (values) => {
+    try {
+      await changePassword.mutateAsync({
+        current_password: values.currentPassword,
+        new_password: values.newPassword,
+      });
+      router.replace("/dashboard");
+    } catch {
+      // Surfaced via changePassword.isError below.
+    }
+  });
+
+  return (
+    <main className="flex min-h-screen items-center justify-center bg-slate-50 px-4 py-12">
+      <div className="w-full max-w-sm animate-fade-in overflow-hidden rounded-lg border border-slate-200 bg-white shadow-sm">
+        <div className="h-1.5 bg-gradient-to-r from-brand-500 via-brand-600 to-brand-700" />
+        <div className="p-8">
+          <div className="flex items-center gap-3">
+            <span className="flex h-9 w-9 shrink-0 items-center justify-center rounded-full bg-brand-50 text-brand-600">
+              <KeyRound className="h-4.5 w-4.5" aria-hidden />
+            </span>
+            <div>
+              <h1 className="text-xl font-semibold text-slate-900">Change your password</h1>
+              <p className="text-sm text-slate-600">
+                An admin requires a new password before you can continue.
+              </p>
+            </div>
+          </div>
+
+          <form onSubmit={onSubmit} className="mt-6 space-y-4" noValidate>
+            <PasswordField
+              label="Current password"
+              autoComplete="current-password"
+              {...register("currentPassword")}
+              error={errors.currentPassword?.message}
+            />
+            <div>
+              <PasswordField
+                label="New password"
+                autoComplete="new-password"
+                hint="At least 10 characters, with a letter and a digit."
+                {...register("newPassword")}
+                error={errors.newPassword?.message}
+              />
+              <PasswordStrengthMeter password={watch("newPassword") ?? ""} />
+            </div>
+
+            {changePassword.isError && (
+              <p className="animate-fade-in text-sm text-red-600" role="alert">
+                {authErrorMessage(changePassword.error)}
+              </p>
+            )}
+
+            <button
+              type="submit"
+              disabled={changePassword.isPending}
+              className="focus-ring inline-flex w-full items-center justify-center gap-2 rounded-md bg-brand-600 px-4 py-2 text-sm font-semibold text-white transition-colors duration-200 hover:bg-brand-700 disabled:cursor-not-allowed disabled:opacity-60"
+            >
+              {changePassword.isPending && <Loader2 className="h-4 w-4 animate-spin" aria-hidden />}
+              {changePassword.isPending ? "Updating…" : "Update password"}
+            </button>
+          </form>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+    </main>
+  );
+}

apps/web/hooks/use-auth.ts

@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ import { useMutation, useQuery, useQueryClient } from "@tanstack/react-query";
 import { ApiError, api, clearTokens, getRefreshToken, setTokens } from "@/lib/api-client";
 import type {
   BanIpPayload,
+  ChangePasswordPayload,
   ConfirmPasswordResetPayload,
+  DeleteAccountPayload,
   LoginPayload,
   RegisterPayload,
   RequestPasswordResetPayload,
@@ -47,6 +49,12 @@ export function useSetSystemSecret() {
   });
 }
 
+export function useCreateDbViewerSession() {
+  return useMutation({
+    mutationFn: () => api.createDbViewerSession(),
+  });
+}
+
 export function useSystemLogs() {
   return useQuery({
     queryKey: ["system-logs"],
@@ -104,6 +112,33 @@ export function useLogout() {
   });
 }
 
+export function useDeleteAccount() {
+  const router = useRouter();
+  const queryClient = useQueryClient();
+  return useMutation({
+    mutationFn: (payload: DeleteAccountPayload) => api.deleteAccount(payload),
+    onSuccess: () => {
+      // Same reasoning as useLogout: we know for certain the account is
+      // gone, so clear and navigate immediately rather than waiting on a
+      // background refetch of ["me"] to fail.
+      clearTokens();
+      queryClient.clear();
+      router.replace("/");
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+export function useChangePassword() {
+  const queryClient = useQueryClient();
+  return useMutation({
+    mutationFn: (payload: ChangePasswordPayload) => api.changePassword(payload),
+    onSuccess: (tokens) => {
+      setTokens(tokens.access_token, tokens.refresh_token);
+      return queryClient.invalidateQueries({ queryKey: ["me"] });
+    },
+  });
+}
+
 export function useVerifyEmail() {
   return useMutation({
     mutationFn: (payload: VerifyEmailPayload) => api.verifyEmail(payload),

apps/web/lib/api-client.ts

@@ -10,7 +10,10 @@ import type {
   CompanyResponse,
   CompanyUpdatePayload,
   ConfirmPasswordResetPayload,
+  ChangePasswordPayload,
   DashboardAnalytics,
+  DbViewerSessionResponse,
+  DeleteAccountPayload,
   DiscoverCompanyRequest,
   DiscoveredCompanyProfile,
   IpBan,
@@ -166,6 +169,9 @@ export const api = {
 
   listSystemSecrets: () => request<SystemSecretStatus[]>("/api/v1/system/secrets"),
 
+  createDbViewerSession: () =>
+    request<DbViewerSessionResponse>("/api/v1/db-viewer/session", { method: "POST" }),
+
   setSystemSecret: (key: string, payload: SetSystemSecretPayload) =>
     request<SystemSecretStatus>(`/api/v1/system/secrets/${key}`, {
       method: "PUT",
@@ -201,6 +207,18 @@ export const api = {
 
   me: () => request<MeResponse>("/api/v1/auth/me"),
 
+  deleteAccount: (payload: DeleteAccountPayload) =>
+    request<void>("/api/v1/auth/me", {
+      method: "DELETE",
+      body: JSON.stringify(payload),
+    }),
+
+  changePassword: (payload: ChangePasswordPayload) =>
+    request<TokenResponse>("/api/v1/auth/change-password", {
+      method: "POST",
+      body: JSON.stringify(payload),
+    }),
+
   verifyEmail: (payload: VerifyEmailPayload) =>
     request<void>("/api/v1/auth/verify-email", {
       method: "POST",

apps/web/lib/types.ts

@@ -29,6 +29,19 @@ export interface SystemSecretStatus {
   value: string | null;
 }
 
+export interface DbViewerSessionResponse {
+  token: string;
+}
+
+export interface DeleteAccountPayload {
+  password: string;
+}
+
+export interface ChangePasswordPayload {
+  current_password: string;
+  new_password: string;
+}
+
 export interface SetSystemSecretPayload {
   value: string;
 }
@@ -66,6 +79,7 @@ export interface UserResponse {
   timezone: string;
   is_active: boolean;
   is_admin: boolean;
+  must_change_password: boolean;
 }
 
 export interface MeResponse extends UserResponse {

apps/web/tests/app-layout.test.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+import { screen, waitFor } from "@testing-library/react";
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import DashboardLayout from "@/app/(app)/layout";
+import { renderWithQueryClient } from "./test-utils";
+
+const replaceMock = vi.fn();
+
+vi.mock("next/navigation", () => ({
+  useRouter: () => ({ push: vi.fn(), replace: replaceMock }),
+  usePathname: () => "/dashboard",
+}));
+
+function meBody(mustChangePassword: boolean) {
+  return {
+    id: "user-1",
+    email: "[email protected]",
+    display_name: "Regular User",
+    timezone: "America/New_York",
+    is_active: true,
+    is_admin: false,
+    auth_mode: "jwt",
+    must_change_password: mustChangePassword,
+  };
+}
+
+function systemStatusBody() {
+  return {
+    app_env: "development",
+    auth_mode: "jwt",
+    llm_provider: "mock",
+    search_provider: "mock",
+    sms_enabled: false,
+    sms_provider: "twilio",
+    ninjapear_configured: false,
+    ninjapear_credit_balance: null,
+    ninjapear_estimated_credits_per_company: null,
+    is_localhost: false,
+    turnstile_site_key: null,
+    components: [],
+  };
+}
+
+function mockFetchImplementation(mustChangePassword: boolean) {
+  return vi.fn().mockImplementation((url: string) => {
+    const path = url.replace("http://localhost:8000", "");
+    if (path === "/api/v1/auth/me") {
+      return Promise.resolve({ ok: true, status: 200, json: async () => meBody(mustChangePassword) });
+    }
+    if (path === "/api/v1/system/status") {
+      return Promise.resolve({ ok: true, status: 200, json: async () => systemStatusBody() });
+    }
+    return Promise.resolve({ ok: false, status: 404, json: async () => ({ detail: "not found" }) });
+  });
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  replaceMock.mockClear();
+});
+
+describe("DashboardLayout - must_change_password redirect", () => {
+  it("redirects to /change-password and withholds the page content when the flag is set", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", mockFetchImplementation(true));
+    renderWithQueryClient(
+      <DashboardLayout>
+        <div>Protected dashboard content</div>
+      </DashboardLayout>,
+    );
+
+    await waitFor(() => {
+      expect(replaceMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith("/change-password");
+    });
+    expect(screen.queryByText(/protected dashboard content/i)).not.toBeInTheDocument();
+  });
+
+  it("renders normally when the flag is not set", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", mockFetchImplementation(false));
+    renderWithQueryClient(
+      <DashboardLayout>
+        <div>Protected dashboard content</div>
+      </DashboardLayout>,
+    );
+
+    expect(await screen.findByText(/protected dashboard content/i)).toBeInTheDocument();
+    expect(replaceMock).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith("/change-password");
+  });
+});

apps/web/tests/change-password-page.test.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+import { screen, waitFor } from "@testing-library/react";
+import userEvent from "@testing-library/user-event";
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import ChangePasswordPage from "@/app/change-password/page";
+import { renderWithQueryClient } from "./test-utils";
+
+const replaceMock = vi.fn();
+
+vi.mock("next/navigation", () => ({
+  useRouter: () => ({ push: vi.fn(), replace: replaceMock }),
+}));
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  replaceMock.mockClear();
+});
+
+describe("ChangePasswordPage", () => {
+  it("rejects a weak new password before submitting", async () => {
+    const user = userEvent.setup();
+    renderWithQueryClient(<ChangePasswordPage />);
+
+    await user.type(screen.getByLabelText(/current password/i), "correct-horse-1");
+    await user.type(screen.getByLabelText(/new password/i), "allletters");
+    await user.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /update password/i }));
+
+    await waitFor(() => {
+      expect(
+        screen.getByText(/must contain at least one letter and one digit/i),
+      ).toBeInTheDocument();
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("submits current + new password and redirects to the dashboard on success", async () => {
+    const fetchMock = vi.fn().mockImplementation((url: string, init?: RequestInit) => {
+      const path = url.replace("http://localhost:8000", "");
+      if (path === "/api/v1/auth/change-password" && init?.method === "POST") {
+        expect(JSON.parse(init.body as string)).toEqual({
+          current_password: "correct-horse-1",
+          new_password: "brand-new-horse-2",
+        });
+        return Promise.resolve({
+          ok: true,
+          status: 200,
+          json: async () => ({
+            access_token: "new-access",
+            refresh_token: "new-refresh",
+            token_type: "bearer",
+            expires_in_minutes: 15,
+          }),
+        });
+      }
+      return Promise.resolve({ ok: false, status: 404, json: async () => ({ detail: "not found" }) });
+    });
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchMock);
+
+    const user = userEvent.setup();
+    renderWithQueryClient(<ChangePasswordPage />);
+
+    await user.type(screen.getByLabelText(/current password/i), "correct-horse-1");
+    await user.type(screen.getByLabelText(/new password/i), "brand-new-horse-2");
+    await user.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /update password/i }));
+
+    await waitFor(() => {
+      expect(replaceMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith("/dashboard");
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("surfaces an error for the wrong current password", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal(
+      "fetch",
+      vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
+        ok: false,
+        status: 401,
+        json: async () => ({ detail: "Incorrect current password" }),
+      }),
+    );
+    const user = userEvent.setup();
+    renderWithQueryClient(<ChangePasswordPage />);
+
+    await user.type(screen.getByLabelText(/current password/i), "wrong-password-1");
+    await user.type(screen.getByLabelText(/new password/i), "brand-new-horse-2");
+    await user.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /update password/i }));
+
+    expect(await screen.findByText(/incorrect current password/i)).toBeInTheDocument();
+  });
+});

apps/web/tests/settings-database-viewer.test.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+import { screen, waitFor } from "@testing-library/react";
+import userEvent from "@testing-library/user-event";
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import SettingsPage from "@/app/(app)/settings/page";
+import { renderWithQueryClient } from "./test-utils";
+
+vi.mock("next/navigation", () => ({
+  useRouter: () => ({ push: vi.fn(), replace: vi.fn() }),
+}));
+
+const ADMIN_USER = {
+  id: "user-1",
+  email: "[email protected]",
+  display_name: "Admin",
+  timezone: "America/New_York",
+  is_active: true,
+  is_admin: true,
+  auth_mode: "jwt",
+  must_change_password: false,
+};
+
+function systemStatusBody(isLocalhost: boolean, authMode: "local" | "jwt") {
+  return {
+    app_env: "development",
+    auth_mode: authMode,
+    llm_provider: "mock",
+    search_provider: "mock",
+    sms_enabled: false,
+    sms_provider: "twilio",
+    ninjapear_configured: false,
+    ninjapear_credit_balance: null,
+    ninjapear_estimated_credits_per_company: null,
+    is_localhost: isLocalhost,
+    turnstile_site_key: null,
+    components: [],
+  };
+}
+
+/** Covers every endpoint SettingsPage's admin-gated boxes touch on mount -
+ * empty-list/no-op responses for everything except /system/status, which
+ * each test configures to drive the local-vs-remote branch under test. */
+function mockFetchImplementation(isLocalhost: boolean, authMode: "local" | "jwt" = "jwt") {
+  return vi.fn().mockImplementation((url: string, init?: RequestInit) => {
+    const path = url.replace("http://localhost:8000", "");
+    const ok = (json: unknown, status = 200) =>
+      Promise.resolve({ ok: true, status, json: async () => json });
+
+    if (path === "/api/v1/auth/me") return ok(ADMIN_USER);
+    if (path === "/api/v1/system/status") return ok(systemStatusBody(isLocalhost, authMode));
+    if (path === "/api/v1/notification-destinations") return ok([]);
+    if (path === "/api/v1/companies") return ok([]);
+    if (path === "/api/v1/system/logs") return ok([]);
+    if (path === "/api/v1/user-api-keys") return ok([]);
+    if (path === "/api/v1/system/secrets") return ok([]);
+    if (path === "/api/v1/auth/security-events") return ok([]);
+    if (path === "/api/v1/admin/ip-bans") return ok([]);
+    if (path === "/api/v1/admin/unban-requests") return ok([]);
+    if (path === "/api/v1/db-viewer/session" && init?.method === "POST") {
+      return ok({ token: "mock-bootstrap-token" });
+    }
+    return Promise.resolve({ ok: false, status: 404, json: async () => ({ detail: "not found" }) });
+  });
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_DB_VIEWER_URL", "https://db.ciagent.org");
+});
+
+describe("Settings - Database viewer box", () => {
+  it("links straight to the local Adminer instance for the local-dev bypass account", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", mockFetchImplementation(true, "local"));
+    renderWithQueryClient(<SettingsPage />);
+
+    const link = await screen.findByRole("link", { name: /open database viewer/i });
+    expect(link).toHaveAttribute("href", "http://localhost:8081/?pgsql=postgres&username=ciagent");
+    expect(link).toHaveAttribute("target", "_blank");
+  });
+
+  it("mints a session token and opens the configured remote viewer URL for a real admin", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", mockFetchImplementation(false, "jwt"));
+    const openSpy = vi.spyOn(window, "open").mockImplementation(() => null);
+    const user = userEvent.setup();
+    renderWithQueryClient(<SettingsPage />);
+
+    const button = await screen.findByRole("button", { name: /open database viewer/i });
+    await user.click(button);
+
+    await waitFor(() => {
+      expect(openSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+        "https://db.ciagent.org/_auth?token=mock-bootstrap-token",
+        "_blank",
+        "noopener,noreferrer",
+      );
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("shows a not-configured message when NEXT_PUBLIC_DB_VIEWER_URL is unset for a remote admin", async () => {
+    vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_DB_VIEWER_URL", "");
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", mockFetchImplementation(false, "jwt"));
+    renderWithQueryClient(<SettingsPage />);
+
+    expect(await screen.findByText(/not configured for this deployment/i)).toBeInTheDocument();
+    expect(screen.queryByRole("button", { name: /open database viewer/i })).not.toBeInTheDocument();
+  });
+});

apps/web/tests/settings-delete-account.test.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+import { screen, waitFor } from "@testing-library/react";
+import userEvent from "@testing-library/user-event";
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import SettingsPage from "@/app/(app)/settings/page";
+import { renderWithQueryClient } from "./test-utils";
+
+const replaceMock = vi.fn();
+
+vi.mock("next/navigation", () => ({
+  useRouter: () => ({ push: vi.fn(), replace: replaceMock }),
+}));
+
+const REGULAR_USER = {
+  id: "user-1",
+  email: "[email protected]",
+  display_name: "Regular User",
+  timezone: "America/New_York",
+  is_active: true,
+  is_admin: false,
+  auth_mode: "jwt",
+  must_change_password: false,
+};
+
+const LOCAL_DEV_USER = {
+  id: "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001",
+  email: "[email protected]",
+  display_name: "Local Developer",
+  timezone: "America/New_York",
+  is_active: true,
+  is_admin: true,
+  auth_mode: "local",
+  must_change_password: false,
+};
+
+function systemStatusBody(isLocalhost: boolean, authMode: "local" | "jwt") {
+  return {
+    app_env: "development",
+    auth_mode: authMode,
+    llm_provider: "mock",
+    search_provider: "mock",
+    sms_enabled: false,
+    sms_provider: "twilio",
+    ninjapear_configured: false,
+    ninjapear_credit_balance: null,
+    ninjapear_estimated_credits_per_company: null,
+    is_localhost: isLocalhost,
+    turnstile_site_key: null,
+    components: [],
+  };
+}
+
+function mockFetchImplementation(
+  isLocalhost: boolean,
+  authMode: "local" | "jwt",
+  meUser: typeof REGULAR_USER,
+) {
+  return vi.fn().mockImplementation((url: string, init?: RequestInit) => {
+    const path = url.replace("http://localhost:8000", "");
+    const ok = (json: unknown, status = 200) =>
+      Promise.resolve({ ok: true, status, json: async () => json });
+
+    if (path === "/api/v1/auth/me") return ok(meUser);
+    if (path === "/api/v1/system/status") return ok(systemStatusBody(isLocalhost, authMode));
+    if (path === "/api/v1/notification-destinations") return ok([]);
+    if (path === "/api/v1/companies") return ok([]);
+    if (path === "/api/v1/system/logs") return ok([]);
+    if (path === "/api/v1/user-api-keys") return ok([]);
+    if (path === "/api/v1/system/secrets") return ok([]);
+    if (path === "/api/v1/auth/security-events") return ok([]);
+    if (path === "/api/v1/admin/ip-bans") return ok([]);
+    if (path === "/api/v1/admin/unban-requests") return ok([]);
+    if (path === "/api/v1/auth/me" && init?.method === "DELETE") return ok(undefined, 204);
+    return Promise.resolve({ ok: false, status: 404, json: async () => ({ detail: "not found" }) });
+  });
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  replaceMock.mockClear();
+});
+
+describe("Settings - Delete account box", () => {
+  it("renders for a regular (non-local-dev) user, disabled until a password is typed", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", mockFetchImplementation(false, "jwt", REGULAR_USER));
+    renderWithQueryClient(<SettingsPage />);
+
+    const button = await screen.findByRole("button", { name: /delete account/i });
+    expect(button).toBeDisabled();
+
+    const user = userEvent.setup();
+    await user.type(screen.getByLabelText(/confirm your password/i), "correct-horse-1");
+    expect(button).not.toBeDisabled();
+  });
+
+  it("is hidden entirely for the local-dev bypass account", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", mockFetchImplementation(true, "local", LOCAL_DEV_USER));
+    renderWithQueryClient(<SettingsPage />);
+
+    await screen.findByText(LOCAL_DEV_USER.email);
+    expect(screen.queryByRole("button", { name: /delete account/i })).not.toBeInTheDocument();
+  });
+
+  it("submits the password, then clears tokens and redirects home on success", async () => {
+    const fetchMock = vi.fn().mockImplementation((url: string, init?: RequestInit) => {
+      const path = url.replace("http://localhost:8000", "");
+      if (path === "/api/v1/auth/me" && init?.method === "DELETE") {
+        expect(JSON.parse(init.body as string)).toEqual({ password: "correct-horse-1" });
+        return Promise.resolve({ ok: true, status: 204, json: async () => undefined });
+      }
+      return mockFetchImplementation(false, "jwt", REGULAR_USER)(url, init);
+    });
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchMock);
+
+    const user = userEvent.setup();
+    renderWithQueryClient(<SettingsPage />);
+
+    const button = await screen.findByRole("button", { name: /delete account/i });
+    await user.type(screen.getByLabelText(/confirm your password/i), "correct-horse-1");
+    await user.click(button);
+
+    await waitFor(() => {
+      expect(replaceMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith("/");
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("shows an error message when the password is wrong", async () => {
+    const fetchMock = vi.fn().mockImplementation((url: string, init?: RequestInit) => {
+      const path = url.replace("http://localhost:8000", "");
+      if (path === "/api/v1/auth/me" && init?.method === "DELETE") {
+        return Promise.resolve({
+          ok: false,
+          status: 401,
+          json: async () => ({ detail: "Incorrect password" }),
+        });
+      }
+      return mockFetchImplementation(false, "jwt", REGULAR_USER)(url, init);
+    });
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchMock);
+
+    const user = userEvent.setup();
+    renderWithQueryClient(<SettingsPage />);
+
+    const button = await screen.findByRole("button", { name: /delete account/i });
+    await user.type(screen.getByLabelText(/confirm your password/i), "wrong-password");
+    await user.click(button);
+
+    expect(await screen.findByText(/incorrect password/i)).toBeInTheDocument();
+  });
+});

docker-compose.prod.yml

@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ services:
       args:
         NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL: ${NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL}
         NEXT_PUBLIC_GIT_REPO_URL: ${NEXT_PUBLIC_GIT_REPO_URL:-}
+        NEXT_PUBLIC_DB_VIEWER_URL: ${NEXT_PUBLIC_DB_VIEWER_URL:-}
     restart: unless-stopped
     depends_on:
       - api
@@ -150,6 +151,19 @@ services:
       - "2222:22"
     logging: *default-logging
 
+  # Settings -> Database viewer: internal-only, reached through nginx's
+  # db.ciagent.org block (app/api/v1/db_viewer.py issues the credential -
+  # see that module's docstring). No host port published.
+  adminer:
+    image: adminer:4.8.1-standalone
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    environment:
+      ADMINER_DEFAULT_SERVER: postgres
+    depends_on:
+      postgres:
+        condition: service_healthy
+    logging: *default-logging
+
   nginx:
     image: nginx:1.27-alpine
     restart: unless-stopped
@@ -157,6 +171,7 @@ services:
       - web
       - api
       - gitea
+      - adminer
     volumes:
       - ./infrastructure/nginx/nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/nginx.conf:ro
       # Cloudflare Origin CA cert/key, generated once via the Cloudflare

docker-compose.yml

@@ -110,5 +110,18 @@ services:
     depends_on:
       - api
 
+  adminer:
+    image: adminer:4.8.1-standalone
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    environment:
+      ADMINER_DEFAULT_SERVER: postgres
+    ports:
+      # Loopback-only, matching this app's loopback-trust philosophy - not
+      # meant to be reachable from the LAN. See Settings -> Database.
+      - "127.0.0.1:8081:8080"
+    depends_on:
+      postgres:
+        condition: service_healthy
+
 volumes:
   postgres-data:

infrastructure/docker/web.Dockerfile.prod

@@ -17,8 +17,10 @@ COPY apps/web ./
 # *browser* will use, not a Docker-internal service name. See .env.example.
 ARG NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL
 ARG NEXT_PUBLIC_GIT_REPO_URL
+ARG NEXT_PUBLIC_DB_VIEWER_URL
 ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL=${NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL} \
-    NEXT_PUBLIC_GIT_REPO_URL=${NEXT_PUBLIC_GIT_REPO_URL}
+    NEXT_PUBLIC_GIT_REPO_URL=${NEXT_PUBLIC_GIT_REPO_URL} \
+    NEXT_PUBLIC_DB_VIEWER_URL=${NEXT_PUBLIC_DB_VIEWER_URL}
 RUN npm run build
 
 

infrastructure/nginx/nginx.conf

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ http {
     # HTTPS at the edge, but the origin shouldn't 400 a direct :80 probe.
     server {
         listen 80;
-        server_name ciagent.org api.ciagent.org git.ciagent.org;
+        server_name ciagent.org api.ciagent.org git.ciagent.org db.ciagent.org;
         return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
     }
 
@@ -79,4 +79,49 @@ http {
             proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
         }
     }
+
+    # Settings -> Database viewer (Adminer). Access isn't gated by a shared
+    # password - the app itself (app/api/v1/db_viewer.py) mints a short-lived
+    # token from a live admin session, which /_auth here exchanges for a
+    # session cookie that /_verify re-checks (including a fresh `is_admin`
+    # lookup) on every request via auth_request. See DEPLOYMENT.md.
+    server {
+        listen 443 ssl;
+        server_name db.ciagent.org;
+
+        ssl_certificate     /etc/nginx/certs/cloudflare-origin.pem;
+        ssl_certificate_key /etc/nginx/certs/cloudflare-origin.key;
+
+        # Adminer renders a raw SQL/data editor - not meant to be framed or
+        # MIME-sniffed as another content type.
+        add_header X-Frame-Options "DENY" always;
+        add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
+
+        # Optional extra hardening for admins with a static IP: uncomment
+        # and set your own address to additionally require it alongside a
+        # valid session (default `satisfy all` - both must pass, not either).
+        # allow 203.0.113.9;
+        # deny all;
+
+        location = /_verify {
+            internal;
+            proxy_pass http://api:8000/api/v1/db-viewer/verify;
+            proxy_pass_request_body off;
+            proxy_set_header Content-Length "";
+            proxy_set_header Cookie $http_cookie;
+        }
+
+        location = /_auth {
+            proxy_pass http://api:8000/api/v1/db-viewer/bootstrap;
+            proxy_set_header Host $host;
+        }
+
+        location / {
+            auth_request /_verify;
+            proxy_pass http://adminer:8080;
+            proxy_set_header Host $host;
+            proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
+            proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
+        }
+    }
 }

scripts/auto-deploy.sh

@@ -28,4 +28,14 @@ docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml build api worker beat web
 docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml run --rm api alembic upgrade head
 docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
 
+# nginx's proxy_pass resolves the api/web service names to a container IP
+# once, at its own worker-process startup - `up -d` above only recreates
+# the containers whose image/config actually changed, so nginx (unchanged)
+# keeps running with the OLD ip, now pointing at a dead container.
+# Confirmed live: this caused a real multi-hour outage (every request to
+# api.ciagent.org / ciagent.org 502'd) after the containers it proxies to
+# got rebuilt out from under it. `restart` forces new worker processes,
+# which re-resolve the current IPs via Docker's embedded DNS.
+docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml restart nginx
+
 echo "$(date -Iseconds) deploy complete: $REMOTE"